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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (k) (1996) ; and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, there are no constitutional provisions nor statutes 
whose interpretation is determinative or of central importance to 
the appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's Motion for Directed Verdict was focused solely on 
the co-Defendant, Bradley Bryant, and not the Utah Transit 
Authority. Plaintiff's Motion was based on Bryant's responses to 
questions relating to his own perceived "failure to yield" and the 
UTA did not need to respond to Plaintiff's Motion at the trial 
level nor should it be required to do so on appeal. 
The trial court correctly denied Plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict based upon all the facts and 
evidence presented to the jury. Material issues of fact upon which 
a jury could reasonably rely included Bryant's admission that he 
did not know exactly why the bus driver put his hand up, no verbal 
communication occurred between the drivers, and importantly, 
comparative fault arguments on the Plaintiff himself. 
Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury that "the 
waiving of another driver to proceed in front of you is not 
negligence since all drivers should know that the waving driver 
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does not have the authority to give up a right-of-way belonging to 
another driver. However, such conduct can be negligence if 
connected with other circumstances relating to the accident, 
accident scene, conditions of the roadway, etc." (See Instruction 
No. 48) In light of all the evidence and inferences presented, 
together with applicable law, the trial court correctly allowed the 
jury to decide the matter. 
Finally, the trial court was under no obligation to use 
Plaintiff's questionnaire and conducted adequate voir dire to 
eliminate bias and prejudice from the courtroom. First, the trial 
judge asked a series of questions to the panel as a whole and then 
individually, probing each potential juror for possible bias or 
preconceived opinions. Second, the trial court allowed the parties 
to conduct personal voir dire with Plaintiff failing to ask one 
single question to one single juror on tort reform. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT WAS DIRECTLY 
FOCUSED ON BRADLEY BRYANT AND NOT THE UTA 
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case-in-chief on February 19, 
1997, Plaintiff made a motion for directed verdict as to the 
liability of Defendant, Bradley Bryant, pursuant to Rule 50(a), 
U.R.C.P. Specifically, Plaintiff stated: 
Ms. Conklin: Yes, your honor. Actually, the Plaintiff 
would like to move for a directed verdict on the issue of 
liability only as to Mr. Bryant based on his admission 
that he failed to yield the right-of-way, which would 
then leave, if it was granted, just the question of 
apportionment. (R. Vol. II 234: 2-7). 
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Plaintiff's motion was denied by the Court on February 21, 
1997. (R. Vol. IV 39: 15-20 and Dist. Ct. R. 618). 
Following the verdict, Plaintiff made a Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b), U.R.C.P. 
Again, the trial court denied this motion. (Dist. Ct. R. 618) . 
As clearly manifest in the record, Plaintiff's motion was 
directed solely at Bryant and not the Utah Transit Authority. The 
motion was based on Bryant's responses regarding questions relating 
to his own perceived "failure to yield." Plaintiff's motion was 
not directed at the Utah Transit Authority nor was it responded to 
at the trial level, and it need not be addressed by this Defendant, 
nor this Honorable Court, on appeal.1 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
BASED UPON ALL THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
The evidence presented by the parties to the jury was 
sufficient to support the verdict. Plaintiff's conclusory remarks 
found in Point II of his argument are based only on a portion of 
the record while omitting critical details as they pertain to the 
Utah Transit Authority. 
1
 Pollesche v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 430, 497 
P.2d 236 (1972). The failure of a party to make a motion for a 
directed verdict not only forecloses the trial court from 
consideration of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
but such failure in addition precludes the appellate court from 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. 
Rule 50(b), U.R.C.P.; Bricrham v. Moon Lake Electric Assn., 24 Utah 
2d 292, 296, 470 P.2d 393 (1970) . Consequently, plaintiff may not 
allege error on the part of the trial court in its denial of the 
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
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First, Plaintiff asserts that while "it is possible that the 
jury found that Bryant completely misinterpreted the driver's hand 
signals [yet] . . . this explanation simply does not hold water." 
(See Appellant's Brief, p. 10). In point of fact, Bryant clearly 
admitted to the jury, with the assistance of his deposition 
testimony during cross-examination, that he did not know exactly 
why the bus driver put his hand up. (R. Vol. I 197: 2-5) . Bryant 
interpreted the hand signals to motion him through although he did 
not know why the driver put his hand up. 
Second, no verbal communication occurred between the bus 
driver and Bryant whatsoever, leaving any hand gestures open to 
individual interpretation (R. Vol. I 195: 12-19). No conversation, 
oral communication or statement was entered into by the bus driver 
and Bryant although the co-Defendant, Mr. Bryant, was quite adamant 
that "we both knew what I was there for, to turn . . . he knew 
what he was there to do was to help - let me get over." (R. Vol. 
I 195: 21-24). 
Again, the bus driver was never identified by any party as the 
bus was merely listed as a non-contract vehicle by the 
investigating officer (R. Vol. I 159: 22-24). 
Third, and quite importantly, Plaintiff argues that "these 
facts, when considered in conjunction with the instruction, leave 
the jury with two possible conclusions . . . that either Bryant 
was negligent or, . . . alternatively, that the bus driver was at 
fault." (See Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12). Whatever happened to 
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the possible conclusions that, perhaps, the Plaintiff was at fault 
or no one was to blame? 
The record is replete with evidence, facts, and inferences 
that Mr. Durrant was at fault regarding this accident, irrespective 
of the allegations made by Plaintiff. Again, counsel for Bryant, 
highlighted four specific areas in her closing argument to the 
jury, based upon the evidence, directly relating to Plaintiff's 
actions. They include (1) Plaintiff's negligence in failing follow 
traffic signs, (2) Plaintiff's failure to merge into the left lane 
in a reasonable manner, (3) plaintiff's failure to operate his 
vehicle at a speed that was reasonable for the conditions, and (4) 
Plaintiff's failure to keep a safe and proper lookout. (Rptr. T. 
20: 7-25; 21: 1-12). 
Apparently, the jury was persuaded by these and other similar 
arguments as reflected in their decision and the trial court 
correctly denied Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict discerning ample evidence to support their verdict. 
Finally, Plaintiff cites Giron v. Welch, 842 P.2d 863 (Utah 
19 92), under the proposition that "Bryant was not reasonable in 
relying on the bus driver's signals" thus supporting his position 
that "this finding is similarly inconsistent with the jury's 
finding that Bryant was not negligent." (See Appellant's Brief, 
p.10) . 
The Supreme Court held in Giron the following: 
Both parties agree that Devine controls the outcome 
of this case. In that case, we concluded that the trial 
court erred in denying a motion for a directed verdict in 
favor of a signaling driver under circumstances 
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substantially similar to the instant case. We held that 
as a matter of law the signalling of another driver to 
proceed was not an act of negligence. We there wrote: 
All the signal amounted to, if given, was a 
manifestation on the part of Metcalf to Mrs. 
Cook that as far as he was concerned Mrs. Cook 
could proceed. At the most all he did was to 
signal to Mrs. Cook and indicate, as far as 
Metcalf was concerned, he yielded her the 
right-of-way. 
It further noted: 
It is possible that under certain conditions upon 
certain highways, such as hills or in the nighttime, a 
driver of a motor vehicle in signalling a car following 
such a vehicle to proceed, might, by such a signal or 
conduct on the part of the driver, be responsible for an 
accident in which the person relying upon such signal to 
proceed became involved. Id. at 864 (quoting Devine v. 
Cook, 3 Ut.2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073, 1083 (1955)). 
Such conditions as outlined by the Supreme Court, i.e., hills 
and nighttime, were not present in the case at hand as clearly 
presented to the jury by both drivers. (R. Vol. I 204: 8-13). 
Following Plaintiff's case-in-chief, Defendant, Utah Transit 
Authority, made a Motion for Directed Verdict, based upon Giron and 
Devine, which motion was denied by the court. (R. Vol. II 216-232: 
23) . 
Notwithstanding these facts and arguments, the trial court 
stated that material issues of fact would need to be decided by the 
jury and allowed the decision to be made by them. A decision was 
made based upon sufficient evidence presented to them. And whether 
or not their deliberations included a bus driver relinquishing only 
his right-of-way in his lane of travel (See Jury Instruction No. 
48) , or the perceived fault of either Bryant and/or Durrant, or 
neither; such discussions were solely within the province of the 
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fact-finder t : • decide based upon all the evidence presented. 
Indeed, the trial c : i irt cor re ::t .] y : : : i ::] l i *• :i t .1 • it i tateri a] issues • : I: 
fact were present and allowed the jury to reach a conclusion and 
likewise, denied Plaintiff's Motion Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
Ill THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO OBLIGATION TO 
1 DMINISTER PLAINTIFF'S QUESTIONNAIRE AND 
CONDUCTED SUFFICIENT VOIR DIRE TO ELIMINATE 
BIAS AND PRECONCEIVED OPINIONS FROM THE COURTROOM 
&s ^d^.i.„_; .-iuCLdniiy noies ... _^ *:i brief, "there is no 
Utah case quiring the use of a questionnaire, or even that 
•-a d I i i i u i i f I i e 
Barrett, 868 r_.i . -.4 citing Hornsby, "58 P. 2d at 333 J. In 
fa~" che tri^ iudqe has sound discretion * * imitinq ^m r dire 
- ; i _*-..- t -*, . P»-4 J U L ij. ,j J U - 1 1 1 
possible issues J: : :as, v. James, ^13 F,2d 781, 798 (Utah 
1991) , 
• „ _ _j- i ebu11a1 to 
?lai::cinz'r a - iega: , ;ns . Firs' . Plain' .: -attacks the District 
/
^r^.}•* -v *- f^ ^  " "*~a ^ "• * ","T *~ ^ ^/~^-r^r^^\'^^ ^o^]3,f ^  v"~v "~ d~" ~*~^ 'y"°'Cj'ardiner tort 
, jui.eii. quest...;, .ee Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 12-14- However, when reviewing the actual transcript 
taken ™n f^ll -cr.te^*" ^ *" " a " C T n ^ ev^i^r' * ^ " tne District Court 
w<, ;Hiitj. -o... j.*. .-.. . .as and opinions 
act repair.; ^ d ry appropriate commentary ai;d specific examples. As a 
prelude u "he ^cv.r1"' *• Tier^ior.f Judcr^ Taylor stated: 
_*•_ *-, ... re going to ao in tne next few moments 
is we're going to be asking questions of each of you. 
And believe me, the questions are not to embarrass anyone 
or make anyone feel bad. The questions are simply so 
that we can get to know you, so that we can hear - so we 
can hear you talk, and so we can kind of get a feel for 
who you are. 
The second reason relates to the fact that there are 
only eight of you who are going to be called upon to 
serve as jurors in this case, and what we're going to be 
seeking are eight people who can be completely neutral, 
who will be willing to sit and listen carefully to the 
evidence and decide the case based upon that evidence, 
not based upon some preconceived notion or how you feel 
about a particular thing. A willingness to be neutral, 
to listen to the facts, to listen to the law, and to 
render justice. That's - that's why we need to talk to 
you and kind of get to know you. (R. Vol. I 4: 8-25, 5: 
1-11) . 
Following this commentary and outline, the judge asked four 
specific questions to the jury panel as a whole. They 
luded: 
1. Is there any of you here who can recall 
specifically reading articles on - on the need 
to change the system? 
2. Do any of you remember reading anything like 
that? 
3. Is there anybody here who has not heard of 
these kinds of cases where - where you felt 
like there maybe was an excessive judgment? 
4. Anybody here who has not heard of those kinds 
of cases? 
(No response) 
Vol. I 26: 16-23). 
As an addendum to this series of questions, the court stated: 
The court: The concern of the court is that we have a 
case here to try. If - if someone comes into the trial 
with a preconceived notion that a particular result 
should be brought about - in other words, if someone has 
a preconceived notion of whether the plaintiff should win 
or the plaintiff should lose, a preconceived notion about 
if - if the plaintiff wins how much money should be 
awarded, I kind of need to know if - if you have some 
pretty strong feelings about that sort of thing. We - we 
want the - we want this case to be decided upon the facts 
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that are adduced here in this court and not be influenced 
by someone's preconceived notions of what ought to happen 
or ought not to happen. Do you see mv c.n^r.&r^^ (v vo1 . 
1 2 7 1 11'" 
Thereafter, the trial -judqe explores] m t \\ n^-i potent i il bias 
iiiiil '"M-Jiy jurui whu raised a liainJ with either a comment 
or question. Such voir dire was not only appropriate but required 
at the hands of a trial judge. 
The modern voir dire process is not merely conducted to 
determine that jurors who have been called to service are 
legally qualified to serve on a jury panel. The process 
has evolved into a means of detecting and, so far as 
possible, elimi nati ng b ^ ^ - ^ .-^i^i^ ^^^^ ^-^ 
courtroom 
State, v. James. ---•-•-- ^ ^ 
It is inteieji^ : r>id^. .ff terms the judge's 
numerous questions *s "in 'attempt r rehabilitate" specific 
\,:^ ..eacrdx bench was somehow advocating c:ie side : - •- • .--. 
Again, pointing to * r.e record *t-^*~ • .. -^  strict rcurt was 
clearly f>i" ~* .._,,. .ormed 
peremptory challenges as required by the Supreme Court of this 
great state. State v. Wort hen, '76^  •« - - Qi4~45 (Utah 
] 9 8 8 ) (• I ! ic • . ? -.-LCAL^ - . . a y . .r , 6 5 1 I: i I 
Second, following the court's own vcir lire cf eacn and every 
potential paror regarding possible bias ar/i - -^-udice, Judge Taylor 
c * i:1' :)i lduct personal 
\ .:: a-re f^ t:.-r panel commencing with m e ramtiff. 
The court: Did you wish LO address questions directly to 
the panel? 
Mr. Conkli.i. -, ^ w,
 ;Gur Honor. 
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The court: . . . go ahead, Mr. Conklin. 
(R. Vol. I 98: 23-25, 100: 19). 
Thereafter, Plaintiff's counsel gave the following preamble to 
the jury panel collectively, followed up with a variety of 
questions to specific individuals and the group as a whole.2 
Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the time where the 
attorneys have an opportunity to ask the panel some - or 
some individuals some questions. And if I were sitting 
where you are, I would be thinking I've already answered 
every question that I want to answer and this is taking 
a long time. 
Let me explain to you, its our - our responsibility in 
representing our client to make sure that we understand 
that there are no biases, or that you come in as we like 
to call it, with a clean slate. And the court has asked 
almost all the questions that we really need to ask, but 
I'm going to ask the panel as a whole a couple of 
questions and if its redundant, I am sorry but well, just 
indulge me. Okay. (R. Vol. 101: 3-17). 
Plaintiff alleges that the District Court erred in failing to 
conduct adequate voir dire regarding tort reform without so much as 
asking one question on the subject himself. Was Plaintiff somehow 
precluded from asking voir dire questions on tort reform on the 
simple basis that the District Court did not use Plaintiff's 
questionnaire? 
It seems ironic that Plaintiff would quote the Supreme Court 
in Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1066 (Utah 1984) when it stated, "The 
fairness of a trial may depend on the right of counsel to ask voir 
dire questions designed to discover attitudes and biases, both 
2
 Plaintiff repeatedly queried the jury panel whether they 
could be "fair and impartial to both sides" as evidenced on at 
least five (5) occasions on the record." (R. Vol. I 105: 10, 22; 
106: 14; 107: 8-9; and 108: 9). 
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conscious and subconscious, even though they 'would not have 
supported a challenge for cause,'" (p. 13?) and yet not ask a 
single question to a single juror concerning tort reform when given 
the opportunity to do so by the court itself. 
Is it Plaintiff's actual position that the "only viable way to 
ensure a plaintiff's right to a fair trial" rests with a trial 
court's use of a questionnaire? (See Appellant's Brief, p. 19) If 
so, it might do Plaintiff justice to review centuries of jury-trial 
practice wherein no such questionnaires were ever utilized. 
CONCLUSION 
This honorable court need not address Plaintiff's Motion for 
Directed Verdict concerning UTA as it was not directed at this 
Defendant. Further, this honorable court should affirm the trial 
court's denial of Plaintiff's Motions for Directed Verdict and 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict based upon the evidence 
presented to the jury and the material issues of fact upon which 
they could base their decision. Finally, the court should find 
that the trial court had no obligation to administer plaintiff's 
questionnaire and conducted sufficient voir dire to eliminate bias 
and preconceived opinions from the courtroom. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 1997. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
ffW-il? 0 0-/vGiU-
DANIEL S. McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Utah Transit Authority/Apdellee 
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